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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual, 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a 
Utah corporation, and DOES 
I through V, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED) 
civil NO. 43690/V7/'CV 
Judge 
Plaintiff, demanding trial by jury, complains of 
Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Lan C. England ("England") is an 
individual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and was 
the founder of the predecessor of Defendant Medicode, 
Incorporated ("Medicode"). England entered into an agreement 
with respect to the sale of the stock in Medicode to Defendant 
Eugene Horbach ("Horbach"), which is the subject of this 
lawsuit. 
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2. Defendant Horbach is an individual resident of 
Bellevue, Washington. Mr, Horbach is a majority owner of shares 
of stock in Medicode, and in that respect and in others, 
regularly and consistently conducts business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and has done so over a substantial period 
of time including, but not limited to, the period of the 
agreements subject of this action. 
3. Defendant Medicode is a Utah corporation, having its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The shares of stock subject of this Complaint are common shares 
in Medicode, which controls and facilitates the transfer of such 
shares. Horbach in turn, by reason of his stock ownership in 
Medicode, exercises complete domination and control over that 
corporation. Medicode is a necessary party to this action in 
that full and complete relief for England will require an 
acknowledgement by Medicode of the stock interest of England and 
will require Medicode to effectuate a transfer of shares of 
Medicode from Horbach to England. 
4. Defendants Does I through V are persons or entities 
who engaged in activities in conjunction or conspiracy with 
Horbach subject to the claims herein, whose identities are 
presently unknown to England. By reason of such activities, 
Defendant Does I through V are jointly and severally liable with 
Horbach to England. When the true identity of said Does are 
discovered by England, they will be more formally named in the 
Complaint. 
2 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-3-4, 78-33-1 and 78-22-
27, et sea. Specifically, Horbach is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this court because of his ownership and 
operation of the business of Medicode in Utah, his regular and 
continuous transaction of business in this state and because the 
agreements subject of this Complaint were entered into and were 
to be performed in the State of Utah. 
6. Venue of this action is proper in this court 
pursuant to the provisions of §§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
in that England and Medicode are residents of the State of Utah, 
the agreement subject of the Complaint was entered into and to 
be performed in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the 
activities giving rise to the claims occurred and accrued in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
7. England was the founder of the predecessor of 
Medicode and one of its principal shareholders. In or about the 
fall of 1989, England owned approximately 256,633 shares of 
Medicode stock, constituting approximately 18.6% of the issued 
and outstanding stock. 
8. After the development of Medicode and the 
establishment of its operations, Horbach contacted England and 
entered into an oral agreement with England pursuant to which 
Horbach agreed to purchase Englandfs stock in Medicode for the 
3 
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sum of $2.75 per share (the "Original Agreement"). Under the 
terms of the Original Agreement, Horbach agreed to pay in cash, 
in or about the latter part of 1989, the total consideration due 
pursuant to the Original Agreement, in exchange for which 
England would execute and deliver over to Horbach a stock 
certificate representing the shares agreed to be purchased by 
Horbach. 
9. In breach of the Original Agreement between the 
parties, Horbach failed and refused to pay the purchase price 
due and, as of May 23, 1991, had paid to England only a portion 
of the purchase price due under the Original Agreement, and 
Horbach was seriously delinquent under the Original Agreement. 
10. At a meeting held on or about May 23, 1991, Horbach 
requested that England execute and deliver to him the stock 
certificate representing Englandfs shares of Medicode and 
Horbach agreed to pay to England the sum of $25,000.00, 
representing the outstanding principal due under the Original 
Agreement. At that time, England did not have the obligation 
to deliver the shares inasmuch as Horbach was in substantial 
breach of the Original Agreement. At that time, the parties 
entered into a new agreement (hereinafter the "Substitute 
Agreement") pursuant to which England agreed to transfer the 
shares, Horbach agreed to pay the remaining principal balance 
and, as additional consideration for England to waive his legal 
rights and claims with respect to the breaches by Horbach, 
Horbach agreed to convey to and hold in trust for England a 
4 
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sufficient number of shares of Medicode which would equal 2% of 
the issued and outstanding shares of Medicode and to deliver 
such shares to England at his direction. Pursuant to the 
Substitute Agreement, Horbach drafted and executed the written 
document, a true and correct copy of which is appended hereto 
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
11. In breach of the Substitute Agreement, the check 
given to England by Horbach for payment of the remaining 
principal balance of the purchase price was drawn on an account 
that was closed and the check was not negotiable. Only after 
demands made by England for performance under the Substitute 
Agreement did Horbach eventually pay the principal sum 
represented by the bad check. 
12. In accordance with the Substitute Agreement, and by 
letter dated December 2, 1992, a true and correct copy of which 
is appended hereto as Exhibit "B", England made demand upon 
Horbach for the issuance to England of his 26,952 shares of 
Medicode held in trust by Horbach, constituting 2% of the issued 
and outstanding shares of Medicode. Despite said written 
instruction, and in breach of the Substitute Agreement between 
the parties, Horbach failed and refused to cause the issuance of 
such shares. Thereafter, counsel for England made demand upon 
counsel for Horbach for the issuance of such shares pursuant to 
a letter dated January 20, 1993, a true and correct copy of 
which is appended hereto as Exhibit "C". Again, in breach of 
the Substitute Agreement between the parties, Horbach failed and 
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refused to cause the issuance and transfer of said shares to 
England, 
13. In addition to the direct, intentional and material 
breach of the Substitute Agreement between the parties by 
Horbach and his failure and refusal to issue or transfer the 
subject shares to England, counsel for Horbach instructed 
counsel for England that Horbach would only agree to provide to 
England shares equal to 2% of the 18.6% of the shares conveyed 
by England and then only after Medicode had engaged in a merger 
and an anticipated public offering. Horbach thereby repudiated 
and breached a substantial and material portion of the 
Substitute Agreement and deprived England of a substantial and 
material portion of the consideration he was to receive pursuant 
to the Substitute Agreement by which Horbach acquired the 18.6% 
of the said issued and outstanding shares of Medicode. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract Against Horbach) 
(Rescission) 
14. For purposes of this First Claim for Relief, 
Plaintiff incorporates the averments of paragraphs 1 through 13 
above. 
15. By reason of Horbachfs willful, substantial and 
material breach of the Substitute Agreement between the parties, 
England is entitled to an order and judgment of rescission 
rescinding the Substitute Agreement between himself and Horbach. 
England hereby tenders to Horbach return of all amounts received 
6 
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by England for purchase of the stock and is entitled to an order 
compelling Horbach to return to England the 18.6% of the shares 
of Medicode. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract Against Horbach) 
(Specific Performance) 
16. For purposes of this Second Claim for Relief, 
Plaintiff incorporates the averments of paragraphs 1 through 15 
above. 
17. In the alternative to England's claims for 
rescission of the Substitute Agreement, in the event it is 
determined that England is not entitled to rescission, England 
is entitled to specific performance of the Substitute Agreement 
as against Horbach and an order requiring him to forthwith 
convey to England a stock certificate representing 2% of the 
issued and outstanding stock of Medicode. 
18. In the alterative, England is entitled to all 
damages incurred by England as a result of Horbach's material 
and substantial breach of the Substitute Agreement between the 
parties, including costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Relief Against Horbach and Medicode) 
19. For purposes of this Third Claim for Relief, 
England incorporates the averments of paragraphs 1 through 18 
above. 
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20. By reason of Horbachfs failure and refusal to abide 
by the terms of the Substitute Agreement and his material and 
substantial breach and repudiation thereof, and by reason of 
Medicode's failure and refusal to acknowledge the ownership and 
interest of England in Medicode, an actual dispute has arisen 
and does now exist between the parties. England contends that 
he is entitled to rescind the agreement with Horbach and England 
is therefore the beneficial owner of 18.6% of Medicode1s stock, 
or, in the alterative, England contends that he is the 
beneficial owner of 2% of the issued and outstanding stock of 
Medicode, that Horbach is required to convey such stock to 
England and that Medicode is required to recognize England as a 
stockholder and to issue a stock certificate to him. Defendants 
deny such contentions. 
21. England is entitled to a judgment and order against 
Horbach and Medicode determining England's rights to stock in 
Medicode now held by Horbach and is entitled to a judgment 
ordering Medicode to forthwith effect a transfer to England of 
such on the official books and records of the corporation so as 
to reflect his ownership and interest therein and to recognize 
England as a stockholder. Such relief is necessary in order for 
the parties to ascertain their rights in the premises and in 
order to avoid a multiplicity of legal actions. 
8 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against Horbach) 
22. For purposes of this Fourth Claim for Relief, 
England incorporates the averments of paragraphs 1 through 21 
above• 
23. Pursuant to the Substitute Agreement, Horbach 
undertook duties as a fiduciary to hold shares of Medicode 
constituting 2% of the issued and outstanding shares of Medicode 
in trust for England and to deliver said shares to England at 
his direction. 
24. England has given to Horbach direct and specific 
written instructions for the issuance of the subject shares to 
England, which directions Horbach has intentionally refused to 
comply with and breached in direct violation of Horbach's 
fiduciary duties to England. 
25. By reason of Horbachfs breach of fiduciary duty, 
England has been substantially damaged in an amount not 
presently fully determined, but in an amount not less than 
$500,000.00 and England is entitled to judgment against Horbach 
in a sum of not less than $500,000.00 plus costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in bringing this action. 
26. By reason of the intentional and willful breach of 
fiduciary duties by Horbach, England is entitled to punitive and 
exemplary damages against Horbach in a sum not less than 
$500,000.00. 
9 
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Injunction as Against Horbach and Medicode) 
27. For purposes of this Fifth Claim for Relief, 
England incorporates the averments of paragraphs 1 through 26 
above. 
28. England is informed and believes that Medicode is 
in the process of effecting a merger with a new corporation and 
that thereafter it intends to conduct a public offering for its 
shares. England is informed and believes that Horbach intends 
to transfer shares held in his name, some of which shares are 
held in trust by him for England and otherwise which are subject 
of this action, which shares are to be transferred without the 
authorization of England and in direct derogation of his rights 
therein. 
29. If the transfers referenced above take place, 
England will suffer immediate and irreparable harm in that his 
interest in Medicode will be transferred in violation of his 
rights, he will be deprived of the right and opportunity to 
participate in decisions concerning the merger, and he will 
irrevocably lose his interest in Medicode, all in derogation of 
his rights. 
30. Accordingly, England is entitled to an injunction 
enjoining Horbach from causing the transfer of any of the 
Medicode shares subject of this action, including the shares 
held by him in trust for England and enjoining Medicode from 
10 
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effecting any transfer or transaction which would effect a 
transfer of such shares to any other person or entity. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as against 
Defendants as follows: 
1. Under the First Claim for Relief, for judgment as 
against Horbach for rescission of the Original Agreement 
pursuant to which England agreed to convey and did convey 18.6% 
of the issued and outstanding stock of Medicode and which 
judgment will compel Horbach to immediately convey to England 
such shares of common stock in Medicode equal to 18.6% of the 
issued and outstanding stock of Medicode in exchange for 
England's tendering of all amounts received by him for purchase 
of such stock such that the parties can be placed in the 
position that they were in before they entered into the 
Substitute Agreement and prior to Horbach!s willful, material 
and substantial breach thereof; 
2. In the alternative, under the Second Claim for 
Relief, for an order compelling and commanding Horbach to convey 
forthwith to England shares of common stock in Medicode equal to 
2% of the issued and outstanding stock in Medicode. In the 
alternative to the order of specific performance, a judgment 
awarding England damages as against Horbach in a sum to be 
determined at trial; 
3. Under the Third Claim for Relief, for a declaratory 
judgment determining the number of shares held by Horbach in 
Medicode to which England is entitled, whether by rescission or 
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by specific performance pursuant to the terms of the Substitute 
Agreement and an order compelling Horbach to transfer said 
shares to England and requiring Medicode to cause such transfer 
and ordering that neither Horbach nor Medicode cause or effect 
the transfer of such shares to any other person or entity; 
4. Under the Fourth Claim for Relief, for judgment 
against Horbach in a sum according to proof, but not less than 
$500,000.00 in damages, together with punitive damages in an 
amount not less than $500,000.00; 
5. Under the Fifth Claim for Relief, for an order 
temporarily and permanently enjoining Horbach and Medicode from 
transferring any of the shares subject of this action to any 
other person or entity until the rights of England therein can 
be determined; 
6. For costs and attorneys fees incurred in bringing 
this claim; and 
7. For such other and further relief as is deemed just 
in the premises. / 
e¥n— /T. DATED t h i s  J> d a y o f March , 1 9 9 3 . 
BURBIDGE/S^MITC 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff1s Address: 
P.O. Box 526145 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6145 
js englancftcom 
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Dear Lan -
I will hold 2% of Medicode stock in 
trust for you forever unless I. have 
different instructions by you on 
disposition of that stock-
E . Horbach EXHIBIT A 
00:0*5 
Eugene Horbach 
E&H Properties 
1220 116th Ave., NE 
2nd Floor 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
December 2, 1992 
Dear Gene, 
I have had an offer for my remaining 2% (26,952 shares) of 
Medicode stock. A copy of this offer is attached. As per our 
agreement, I am asking you to instruct the appropriate personnel to 
effectuate this transaction as soon as possible. This is in no way 
an enticement to encourage you or the company to purchase my 
shares. 1 am sensitive to the challenging times you have faced. 
Mr. Porter's offer is legitimate and he is a qualified investor—he 
has been interested in Med-Index/Medicode for several years. As a 
shareholder, he would certainly be an asset to the Company. 
Again, please expedite this transaction as soon as possible. 
The offer is time sensitive, and we need the funds to meet 
publishing deadlines which are critical to us at this time of year. 
Best wishes, 
Lan C. England 
801-268-9777 
FAX 801-485-7803 
cc: Eileen Shanon 
Brent Anderson 
Max Farbman 
Sandra Horbach 
EXHIBIT B 
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P.O. Box 526145 • Salt Lake City, Utah, 84152-6145 • (801) 487-5649 • 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
ALONZO W. WATSON. JR. 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
HERSCHEL J . SAPERSTEIN 
MITCHELL MELICH 
OON B. ALLEN 
CLARK P. GILES 
ROBERT M. GRAHAM 
NARRVEL E. HALL 
JAMES L. WILDE 
HERBERT C LIVSEY 
WILLIAM A. MARSHALL 
JAMES Z. OAVIS 
PAUL S. FELT 
O. JAY CURTIS 
GERALD T. SNOW 
ALAN A. ENKE 
WESTON L. HARRIS 
JONATHAN A. DIBBLE 
SCOTT H. CLARK 
STEVEN H. GUNN 
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BRAD O. HARDY 
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JOHN P. HARRINGTON 
BRENT W. TOOO 
LARRY G. MOORE 
DALE M. OKERLUNO 
BRUCE U OLSON 
JOHN A. ADAMS 
OOUGLAS M. MONSON 
CRAIG CARLILE 
STEVEN W. HARRIS 
RICHARD H. CASPER 
JAMES M. DESTER 
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KEVIN G. GLADE 
LESTER K. ESSIG 
IRA 8. RUBINFELO 
BOYD A FERGUSON 
STEVEN T. WATERMAN 
STEPHEN C. TINGEY 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR 
KELLY J- FLINT 
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STEVEN J . AESCHBACHER 
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RICK L. ROSE 
RICK B. HOGGARD 
USA A. YERKOVICH 
BRENT O. WRIOE 
MICHAEL E. BLUE 
SCOTT A HAGEN 
STEVEN W. CALL 
CAMERON M. HANCOCK 
ELAINE A. MONSON 
SYLVIA IANNUCCI 
KATIE A. ECCLES 
JARED M. HARRIS 
GEORGE S. ADONDAKIS 
DAVIOA.CUTT 
JULIA M. HOUSER 
January 20, 1993 
400 OESERET BUILDING 
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TELEPHONE ISOI) 532-1500 
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2IO FIRST SECURITY BANK BLDG. 
92 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
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TELEPHONE (801) 226-72IO 
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OF COUNSEL 
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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
George Tingo, Jr., Esq. 
Golden and Tingo 
21-C-Alta Street 
San Francisco 94133 
Re: Medicode, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Tingo: 
On behalf of Lan C. England, we hereby demand the immediate issue of a stock 
certificate in Mr. England's name for 26,952 shares of common stock of Medicode, Incorporated 
(the "Company"), representing two percent (2%) of the stock of the Company. Enclosed 
herewith is a copy of the document signed by Eugene Horbach evidencing Mr. England's 
ownership interest. 
This is to advise you that we will immediately take appropriate legal action in the event 
that the stock certificate is not issued within seven days of the receipt of this letter. Mr. 
England has received an offer to purchase his interest in the Company, an offer that Mr. 
England risks losing if the stock certificate is not issued to him in a timely fashion. In the event 
Mr. England is unable to consummate this sale, we will seek recovery of the purchase price 
offered to Mr. England as well as damages for lost opportunity and such other consequential 
damages as are appropriate with respect to any business investment losses. 
JAA:lj 
cc: Lan C. England 
Sincerely yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
n A. Adams 
10054 .SLI E X H I B I T , ^ 
Addendum 17 
Steven L. Taylor (3210) 
Of Counsel With 
SMITH Sc HANNA, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, ] 
Plaintiff, 3 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an ] 
individual, MEDICODE, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah ] 
corporation, and DOES I 
through V, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) HORBACH'S ANSWER TO 
COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. 930901471CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Eugene Horbach ("Horbach")/ by and through his attorney, 
hereby answers the Complaint of plaintiff and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against 
Horbach upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Responding to the particular allegations contained in the 
Complaint, Horbach admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
1. Horbach admits the allegations of paragraph 1. 
2. Horbach admits the allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Horbach admits that Medicode is a Utah corporation 
and that Horbach is an owner of common shares of Medicode. Being 
uncertain as to plaintiff's allegation that Medicode controls and 
faa^-s^" 
C0035 
facilitates the transfer of Medicode common shares, Horbach denies 
that allegation. Horbach denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 3. 
4. Horbach is without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 4 and 
therefore denies them. 
5. As to paragraph 5, Horbach denies that he operates 
the business of Medicode in Utah and alleges that ownership of 
common shares in Medicode is insufficient to confer jurisdiction in 
this Court. Further, Horbach denies that he regularly and 
continuously transacts business in Utah. Finally, Horbach admits 
that his agreement with plaintiff to purchase plaintiff's shares in 
Medicode was entered into in Utah and that plaintiff's Exhibit "A" 
was drafted in Utah but denies that either the agreement nor the 
document designated Exhibit "A" were to be performed in Utah. 
6. Horbach admits that plaintiff and Medicode are 
residents of Utah, admits that the agreement to purchase 
plaintiff's shares in Medicode was entered into in Salt Lake County 
and denies the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 6. 
7. Horbach is without sufficient knowledge or 
information to admit or deny the allegations of paragraph 7 and 
therefore denies them. 
8. Upon information and belief, Horbach denies the 
allegation regarding initial contact between Horbach and plaintiff. 
Horbach admits the remaining allegations of paragraph 8. 
- 2 -
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9. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 9 and 
affirmatively alleges that Horbach was, at all material times, in 
substantial compliance and that plaintiff never declared a breach 
under the original agreement. 
10. Horbach admits the allegations in the first sentence 
of paragraph 10. Horbach denies the allegations of the second 
sentence of paragraph 10 and affirmatively alleges that Horbach was 
in substantial performance of the original agreement and that there 
was no material breach on Horbach's part. With respect to the 
third sentence of paragraph 10, Horbach admits that he agreed to 
pay the remaining balance due on purchase of plaintiff's shares and 
denies the remaining allegations of that sentence. As to the last 
sentence of paragraph 4, Horbach admits that he executed the 
document designated Exhibit "A" and denies the remaining 
allegations of that sentence. 
11. Horbach admits that he discharged the original 
agreement by paying plaintiff any remaining sum due plaintiff, 
denies that Horbach was in breach of plaintiff's alleged substitute 
agreement, and denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 11. 
12. Horbach denies that there was a substitute agreement 
as alleged by plaintiff, admits the existence of the documents 
designated as Exhibits "B" and "C" to plaintiff's Complaint and 
denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 12. 
13. Horbach admits that Horbach offered to provide to 
plaintiff shares equal to 2% of the 18.6% of the shares owned by 
Horbach, affirmatively alleges that such offer was an offer of 
- 3 -
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settlement only and denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 
13. 
14. Responding to paragraph 14, Horbach incorporates his 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 13 as if fully set forth herein. 
15. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 15. 
16. Responding to paragraph 16, Horbach incorporates his 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
17. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 17 and 
affirmatively alleges that the alleged substitute agreement is 
void. 
18. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 18. 
19. Responding to paragraph 19, Horbach incorporates his 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 18 as if fully set forth herein. 
20. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 20. 
21. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 21. 
22. Responding to paragraph 22, Horbach incorporates his 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth herein. 
23. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 23. 
24. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 24. 
25. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 25. 
26. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 26. 
27. Responding to paragraph 27, Horbach incorporates his 
responses to paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully set forth herein. 
28. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 28. 
29. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 29 and 
affirmatively alleges that only shareholders of record, pursuant to 
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applicable Utah law, are entitled to notice of and participation in 
a merger. 
30. Horbach denies the allegations of paragraph 30. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed, in that the 
agreements have been fully performed, satisfied and discharged. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims against Horbach under the "substitute 
agreement" should be dismissed because that agreement violates the 
Rule Against Perpetuities and is, therefore, null and void. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of laches, 
waiver or estoppel. 
WHEREFORE, Horbach prays that the Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice and upon the merits, and that he be awarded his 
costs incurred, together with all other such relief to which he may 
prove to be ent: 
DATED this ^ A ^ " day of ApriJ ) « / y ^  
Steven L. Taylor 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENGLAND, LAN C : 
PLAINTIFF, 
: SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
-VS-
CASE NO. 930901471 CV 
HORBACH, EUGENE : 
MEDICODE INCORPORATED : HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON OCTOBER 5, 1993 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON DECEMBER 21, 1993 AT 10:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 02 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO 
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY 
DECEMBER 21, 1993 AT 10:00 A.M. . OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE T 
SEPARATELY. 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
NOVEMBER 12, 1993 AT 5:00 P.M. 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 30 DAYS PRIOR TO TR: 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
DECEMBER 13, 1993 AT 8:30 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT, 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,0(10, COUNSEL SHOULD PREPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. / 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
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D
-C 1 "» £03 
STEVEN L. TAYLOR (#3210) 
Of Counsel with 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Defendant Eugene Horbach 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual,] 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a 
Utah corporation, and DOES I ; 
through V, ; 
Defendants. ; 
) MOTION FOR: CONTINUANCE 
) OF TRIAL, LEAVE TO FILE 
) COUNTERCLAIM, AND TO 
) EXTEND DISCOVERY PERIOD 
) Civil No. 930901471 CV 
) JUDGE J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Horbach hereby moves the court for a continuance 
of trial, for leave to file a counterclaim, and to extend discovery 
in this matter. The grounds for this Motion are set forth herein. 
FACTS 
The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about March 15, 
1993 and was subsequently served on Defendant Horbach, a non-
resident. Defendant Horbach filed an answer on or about April 30, 
1993. Discussions were then entered into between Plaintiff's 
counsel at that time and Defendant Horbachfs counsel regarding 
discovery. Some time during the week of July 26, 1993, Plaintiff 
C0184 
changed counsel and Plaintiff's current counsel filed a writ of 
attachment, which was issued ex-party because Defendant's counsel 
was out of town that week. 
On August 5, 1993, a hearing was held regarding the writ of 
attachment and the court issued an order extending the writ during 
the pendency of the action. Subsequent to that hearing, no 
additional discovery had occurred. On August 25, 1993, Plaintiff 
filed a certification of readiness for trial and a motion for 
pretrial conference. On October 5, 1993, the parties and the court 
entered into a scheduling order and trial notice. At that time, no 
discovery had been accomplished. In the scheduling order, the 
court ordered, inter alia, that all discovery be concluded by 
November 12, 1993. At the time of the scheduling order, 
Defendant's counsel believed the time frames set forth therein to 
be realistic. 
Shortly after the entry of the scheduling order, however, 
the Plaintiff left the country for several weeks. Consequently, 
Defendant was unable to depose Plaintiff until November 18, 1993. 
In addition, Plaintiff was unable to depose Defendant until 
November 22, 1993. This delay of approximately six (6) weeks has 
materially affected the time frame set forth in the scheduling 
order. 
In the context of the Complaint and Answer as filed, there 
appeared to be no issue as to cash consideration owed and paid to 
Plaintiff by Defendant. In Plaintiff's deposition, however, 
2 
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Plaintiff raised, for the first time, the possibility that 
Plaintiff was still owed by Defendant $50,000.00. England 
deposition, pgs. 27-28. Prior to this time, Defendant had no 
reason to believe that he still owed Plaintiff any cash 
\ consideration. Subsequently to Plaintiff's deposition, Defendant 
i| 
commenced an internal review of this matter. By the date of 
•« Defendant's deposition, a preliminary review revealed that, during 
i * 
n 
I the period of time Defendant was tendering installment payments to 
Plaintiff, Defendant's accounting department was issuing checks on 
at least three, and possibly four, bank accounts and that the 
payments to Plaintiff attributable to the purchase of the shares 
jj which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, appeared to exceed the 
agreed upon price between Plaintiff and Defendant. Because this 
was the first notice Defendant had of the possibility of 
I
 overpayment, Defendant ordered his accounting department to locate 
!l the canceled checks. Defendant's staff is, however, experiencing 
H 
,j difficulty obtaining those records because they are in storage and 
• in an order to attempt to expedite the acquisition of these 
records, Defendant is prepared to pay the additional expense of 
ordering copies from the various banking institutions. That 
however cannot be accomplished prior to the scheduled trial date of 
II December 21, 1993. 
II 
In addition, counsel for Defendant had requested, at 
Plaintiff's deposition, copies of certain documents in Plaintiff's 
possession. Plaintiff agreed to provide those documents. To date 
3 
00186 
Addendum 26 
j Plaintiff has not provided the documents, despite further requests 
! i 1
 l 
jj from Defendant's counsel. The reason for the delay has been stated 
, that the documents are in storage and difficult to locate. That 
reason was again provided by Plaintiff to Defendant's counsel on 
• December 13, 1993, immediately prior to the settlement conference 
with the court. 
ARGUMENT 
Based upon Defendant's newly discovered evidence and 
h 
I, depending upon additional documents discovery as stated above, 
. Defendant may have a counterclaim which fits squarely within 
j ; 
jj paragraph (a) of Rule 13, U.R.C.P. Defendant's counterclaim arises 
i! out of the subject-matter of this lawsuit and should be adjudicated 
] at the same time as Plaintiff's claims. To deny Defendant leave to 
:
, file a counterclaim in this matter would work a substantial 
prejudice and manifest injustice to Defendant. Such denial may 
mean that Defendant would lose the right to adjudicate his 
; counterclaim before this court. Alternatively, the sensible course 
' in this matter would be to allow the parties additional time to 
complete discovery on this newly discovered evidence and allow the 
court to fully adjudicate all of the issues between the parties 
arising out of the subject matter of this litigation. 
Because of the delay in accomplishing deposition discovery 
i« caused by Plaintiff's excursion out of the country, counsel for the 
parties have attempted to accomplish discovery on an "informal" 
I! basis. At this point in time, however, that has not been 
' I 
i 
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successfully accomplished because of difficulty, on the part oi 
both parties, of locating documents requested. 
Subsequent to Plaintiff's deposition, and subsequent tc 
Defendant's deposition, and based upon the newly discovered 
evidence on Defendant's part, counsel for Defendant has requested 
the assistance of counsel for Plaintiff in seeking an extension of 
|| the trial date in order to fully accomplish discovery. Plaintiff 
has, for whatever reasons, refused. The granting, however, of 
Defendant's Motion will not, in any way, prejudice Plaintiff. 
There is currently in escrow in Salt Lake City, Utah, the sum of 
$369,000.00 to secure Plaintiff's claims should he prevail. 
Pursuant to the order of this court, that amount will remain in 
escrow pending resolution of the issues between the parties. 
ij 
; CONCLUSION 
j; Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectively requests 
the court grant Defendant's Motion. It is clear that the amount in 
controversy is not insubstantial and that additional time is 
clearly needed for discovery. This court has the power to grant 
|j Defendant's Motion in the interest of justice and in order to 
ji 
j prevent substantial prejudice and manifest injustice to Defendant. 
• J 
i 
| RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
! 1993. 
STEVEN L. TAYLOR,/of counsel 
Murphy, Tolboe &(Mabey I 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Horbach 
a:\horbach\m-contin.ext Ny- S 
C0188 
Addendim oo 
C : ' , 1 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Randy T. Austin (A6171) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, MEDICODE 
INCORPORATED, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
HORBACH'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL, 
LEAVE TO FILE A 
COUNTERCLAIM, AND TO 
EXTEND DISCOVERY PERIOD 
Civil No. 930901471 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff Lan C. England ("England") submits the following Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Eugene Horbach's ("Horbach") Motion for Continuance of 
Trial, Leave to File a Counterclaim and to Extend Discovery Period. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
This matter was set for trial on December 21, 1993, at a pretrial hearing held 
October 5, 1993. Horbach asks the Court to continue that trial date and allow him to 
file a counterclaim based on newly discovered evidence. England disputes the validity 
of Horbach's request. 
Horbach contends that delay in deposing England has prejudiced his ability to 
prepare for trial. England's deposition was taken on November 18, 1993. However, 
Horbach has waited until just a few days before trial to indicate that this delay has 
hindered his ability to prepare for trial. England encountered similar difficulty in 
deposing Horbach. England was unable to depose Horbach until November 22, 1993. 
Nonetheless, England is presently prepared to proceed to trial on this matter. 
Horbach also suggests that England has added a claim that Horbach owes him 
$50,000.00. That is not the case. No new claim has been added. Horbach indicates 
that the deposition of England has created new issues. He also suggests that his review 
of documents subsequent to the England's deposition uncovered additional relevant 
evidence. However, this so-called newly discovered evidence is irrelevant. The 
evidence concerns other transactions and deals between England and Horbach 
unrelated to the resolution of the issues before the Court. Further, this evidence was 
- 2 -
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admittedly always in the possession of Horbach, and any delay or failure to discover 
this evidence is directly attributable to lack of diligence on Horbach's part. 
Horbach also contends that England has failed to produce certain documents 
requested at England's deposition. England has provided copies of all documents he 
has been able to find to date and will continue to produce documents discovered 
between now and trial. 
England's contention in his pleadings and throughout the course of this matter 
has been that Horbach failed to transfer two percent (2%) of the stock of Medicode as 
promised in an agreement between the parties. The Court should be aware that 
Horbach has made no settlement offer during the course of these proceedings while 
England has tried to open settlement discussions repeatedly and has made two written 
and one oral offer. 
ARGUMENT 
The decision to grant or deny continuance of trial lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App. 1983). The Court should 
deny the Motion for a Continuance in this matter for several reasons. 
First, despite the fact that all "newly discovered evidence" was in control of 
Horbach, Horbach failed to notify England or the Court of this newly discovered 
- 3 -
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evidence until the final pretrial settlement conference on December 13, 1993--just eight 
(8) days before trial. 
Second, continuance of the trial at this late date, based on Horbach's lack of 
diligence, will seriously prejudice the interests of England. While Horbach contends 
that England will not be prejudiced because any damages which may be proved at trial 
have been placed in an escrow account, England disputes this contention. England will 
suffer serious prejudice. He will be denied the use of those funds for the period in 
which the trial is delayed. Moreover, England's efforts to try this matter expeditiously 
will be frustrated. 
Finally, the Court should reject Horbach's argument that he will be prejudiced if 
the trial is not delayed. In fact, the only possible prejudice which Horbach may suffer 
is due to his own lack of diligence. England's efforts to secure a speedy trial in this 
matter should not be frustrated due to Horbach's lack of diligence. 
In addition, the Court should reject Horbach's request for leave to file a 
counterclaim. First, at the pretrial settlement conference, Horbach was authorized to 
file a Motion for Continuance but not a Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim. 
Second, untimely motions to file counterclaims must be denied. {See Trip v. Vaughn, 
746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (court refused to allow a defendant to bring a 
counterclaim which was filed thirteen (13) months after the answer to the complaint). 
- 4 -
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Accordingly, the Court should not at this late date grant Horbach leave to file a 
counterclaim. Particularly, in light of the fact that the supposed evidence giving rise to 
the counterclaim has always been in Horbach's control. 
Finally, Horbach's contention that additional discovery is required in this matter 
is without merit. Simply stated, if Horbach is not prepared to go to trial, he has no 
one to blame but himself. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the "newly-discovered evidence" has always been in the possession of 
Horbach and because any failure to discover such evidence is due to lack of diligence 
on Horbach's part, the Court should reject the Motion for Continuance of the Trial 
Date. England is prepared to proceed to trial and should not be prejudiced by 
Horbach's lack of diligence. Moreover, the Court should reject Horbach's request to 
file an amended counterclaim and extend discovery. As indicated above, the Motion to 
File a Counterclaim has not been timely filed and was not authorized by the Court at 
the final pretrial conference. 
DATED this 16^-day of December, 1993. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
00197 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENGLAND, LAN C 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HORBACH, EUGENE 
MEDICODE INCORPORATE DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 930901471 CV 
DATE 12/20/93 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED DECEMBER 15, 1993, 
THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT HORBACH'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL, 
ETC. IS DENIED, FOR THE REASONS STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION. 
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENGLAND, LAN C 
-VS-
PLAINTIFF, 
HORBACH, EUGENE 
MEDICODE INCORPORATED 
DEFENDANT. 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 930901471 CV 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON JANUARY 25, 1994 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MARCH 22, 1994 AT 10:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
MARCH 11, 1994 AT 5:00 P.M. s&S& 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 30 DAYS PRIOR TO « 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
MARCH 14, 1994 AT 8:30 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PREPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. / 
DATED THIS 25TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1?£4. / /} / 
iff urnj Jmiur 
DISTRIgC/£0URT>3tfDGI 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
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 t i.llt« *, o». , A 
Stephen G. Crockett (#0766) 
Wesley D. Felix (#6539) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & 
PETERSON 
170 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Steven L. Taylor (#3210) 
Of Counsel with 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 S. 600 E. #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual, 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a 
Utah corporation, and DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants. 
TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 930901471CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant, Eugene Horbach ("Horbach"), submits this 
memorandum to assist the Court in determining the law applicable 
to the factual issues in this case. In particular, this case 
requires the Court to determine the status of an alleged 
substitute agreement between Plaintiff, Lan England ("England11), 
C0213 
unfulfilled condition precedent for longer than the maximum 
period [of the rule]. [I]t is, therefore, not enough to sustain 
the validity of a limitation that the condition precedent thereof 
is highly likely to be fulfilled, or that it is in fact 
fulfilled, within the maximum period. Such fulfillment must have 
been certain to occur, in order to have the limitation valid." 
Restatement of Property, § 370, comment k (1944); see also Scott, 
The Law of Trusts, § 62.10 (4th ed. 1987). 
In the instant case, the alleged trust note fails under the 
rule for both of the above reasons: that is (1) by its terms, 
the trust outlasts the rule, and (2) no vested interest is 
created by the document, vesting being subject to a power of 
appointment which by its terms is not certain to occur within the 
period of the rule. Thus, the purported trust created by the 
note is ineffective and void. 
III. OVERPAYMENT OF A CONTRACT OBLIGATION DUE TO MISTAKE IS 
REMEDIABLE BY RESTITUTION 
Horbach mistakenly overpaid England in the amount of 
approximately $350,000. Some $200,000 of this represents 
overpayment for 250,000 shares of MDR stock which Horbach agreed 
to purchase for $200,000. The remaining amount resulted from 
Horbach1s overpayment with respect to his purchase of 258,363 
shares of Medicode stock from England. These overpayments should 
be returned to Horbach. 
10 
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Unilateral mistake is remediable when it is a mistake in 
performance which results in overpayment,13 In cases of 
mistaken overpayment a remedy in restitution is well established 
under theories of quasi-contract and unjust enrichment. Dan B. 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 757 (2d ed. 1993); Messersmith v. G.T. 
Murray & Co., 667 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1983) ("[M]oney paid under 
a mistake of fact, which would not otherwise have been paid, may 
be recovered unless the payee has changed his position to the 
extent that it would be unjust to require a refund.") 
Restitution is to be equivalent to the full amount of 
overpayment. Id. Thus, in this case, Horbach is entitled to 
An action for restitution on the ground of overpayment 
is, properly, a counterclaim. This counterclaim was not 
expressly raised by the Defendant in the pleadings. 
Nevertheless, the total payment made and received for the 
purchase of the 18.6 percent of Medicode stock in issue has been 
regarded by both parties as a central contention from the 
beginning of this case. Defendant only recently, obtained 
adequate documentary evidence to support his claim of 
overpayment. And Plaintiff has had a full opportunity to prepare 
a response to Defendant's claims. Indeed, at a settlement 
hearing before this court on March 14, 1994, counsel for the 
Plaintiff indicated that he would not be prejudiced by the 
introduction of evidence going to overpayment by the Defendant. 
Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure suggests 
that the Court should liberally allow amendment to add 
counterclaims "where justice requires." See Gillman v. Hansen, 
486 P.2d 1045 (1971) (holding that failure to allow amendment of 
answer to include newly discovered counterclaim was an abuse of 
discretion). In the instant case, on the one hand, ignoring 
evidence of overpayment in the amount of nearly $350,000 by the 
Defendant would perpetrate a substantial injustice. On the other 
hand, allowing such evidence to be introduced would not prejudice 
any legitimate interest of the Plaintiff. 
11 
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restitution in the amount of $349,101.10 from England as this 
figure represents the full amount of his overpayment.14 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the case will show that Horbach never 
intended, by way of the May 23 "note", to grant to England 2% of 
Medicode stock. Even if the Court determines that this is the 
most reasonable interpretation of the "note," it was not part of 
a bargained for exchange, was unsupported by consideration, and 
is unenforceable. In addition, the "note" is void as it violates 
the rule against perpetuities. Finally, the evidence will 
demonstrate that Horbach mistakenly overpaid England by the 
amount of $349,101.25 and that he should receive an equal amount 
in restitution. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 22nd day of March, 1994. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER 
& PETERSON 
-Jto^n ^C) X*l^-
Stephen G. Crockett 
Wesltey D. Felix 
Steven L. Taylor 
14
 This figure excludes payments made to gratuitously, but 
intentionally made to England, for example, the $25,000 payment 
made in response to England's December 20, 1990 request. 
12 
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Stephen G. Crockett (#0766) 
Wesley D. Felix (#6539) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & 
PETERSON 
170 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Steven L. Taylor (#3210) 
Of Counsel with 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
EUGENE HORBACH, an individual,) 
MEDICODE, INCORPORATED, a ) 
Utah corporation, and DOES I ) Civil No. 930901471CV 
through V, ) 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, sitting without a jury, 
on May 22, 1994. Samuel D. McVey and Randy Austin appeared as 
counsel for the Plaintiff and Stephen G. Crockett, Steven L. 
Taylor, and Wesley D. Felix appeared as counsel for Defendant. 
The Court having considered the oral and documentary evidence 
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presented at trial and the briefs submitted by the parties, and 
being fully advised in this matter, now makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff, Lan C. England, sought by his 
Complaint a determination that the Defendant, Eugene Horbach, 
breached his purported contract of May 23rd, 1991, wherein the 
Defendant allegedly agreed to hold in perpetuity two percent of 
the Medicode stock in question in trust for the Plaintiff, 
Additionally, the Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Defendant on the theory that the Plaintiff is 
entitled to the stock in question and sought an order from this 
Court enjoining the Defendant from disposing of that stock 
pending the outcome of this litigation. 
2. This Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
August the 5th of 1993 on the temporary restraining order issued 
by Judge Timothy Hanson and converted the temporary restraining 
order to a preliminary injunction to prohibit disposal of said 
two percent of the stock. The parties by stipulation now have 
sold the stock and the proceeds, $369,140.60, have been placed 
into escrow account no. 30804165 with Guardian State Bank of Salt 
Lake City, Utah awaiting this Court's decision as to ownership of 
the proceeds. 
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3. The escrow agreement for the above-referenced 
account directs the Escrow Agent to disburse the escrow funds 
upon the written direction of the parties, or upon the order of 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
4. The Court finds that in late 1989, the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant entered into an oral stock purchase agreement 
whereby the Defendant agreed to purchase from the Plaintiff 
258,363 shares of stock in Medicode, Inc. at a price of $2,75 per 
share for a total purchase price of $710,498.25. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant made his first 
payment toward the purchase price on December 29, 1989 in the 
amount of $60,000.00. Defendant also paid $4,599.35 to reimburse 
the Plaintiff for certain expenses incurred. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant made certain 
payments toward purchase of the Medicode stock between December 
29, 1989 and September 11, 1990. As of September 11, 1990 the 
Defendant had paid to the Plaintiff for the stock a total of 
$855,000. The Court finds that no portion of these payments were 
made for services rendered by Plaintiff or for Plaintiff's 
agreement to go forward with the merger. 
7. The Court finds that even if all payments alleged 
by the Plaintiff to be for services and not for the purchase of 
stock were omitted from the calculation of the total paid by the 
Defendant toward purchase of Medicode stock, Defendant would 
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still have paid more than required under the 1989 agreement as of 
May 23, 1991. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's testimony, 
stating that he had an agreement to perform real estate 
inspection or consulting services for the Defendant, is not 
credible in light of the Plaintiff's inability to adduce any 
evidence regarding the rate of pay, the duration of the 
agreement, or the nature of the services presumably performed. 
9. The Court finds that as of September 14, 19 90, 
Defendant had overpaid the Plaintiff by $144,501.75. Plaintiff, 
thus, had been overpaid by $144,501.75 as of May 23, 1991, the 
date of the disputed two percent agreement. 
10. The Court finds that on May 23, 1991 the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant met at the offices of Medicode, Inc. for the 
purpose of transferring 258,363 shares of Medicode stock to the 
Defendant. 
11. The Court finds that at the May 23rd meeting both 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant mistakenly believed that $25,000 
remained owing under the 1989 stock purchase agreement. At trial 
the Plaintiff admitted that as of May 23, 1991 no money was owed 
on the stock purchase agreement as of that date. 
12. The Court finds that on May 23, 1991, the 
Defendant under the mistaken belief, sponsored by the Plaintiff, 
that $25,000 remained due and owing on the 1989 agreement, 
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executed the note, entered into evidence as Exhibit 3, which is 
the basis of Plaintiff's alleged substitute agreement. 
13. Subsequent to the purported May 23rd agreement, 
and in reliance upon the mistaken belief that $25,000 remained 
owing, the Defendant paid an additional $25,000 to the Plaintiff. 
14. The Court finds that as of the date of trial, the 
Defendant had overpaid the Plaintiff on the 1989 stock purchase 
agreement in the amount of $169,501.75 
15. The Defendant has moved, pursuant to Rule 15(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence. Evidence going to overpayment was 
introduced by counsel for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
No objection was entered to the introduction of such evidence on 
the ground that it was not within the issues of the case, and the 
issue of overpayment was tried by the express and implied consent 
of the parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. Defendant argues that the May 23, 1991 agreement 
is unenforceable because lacking consideration. The burden of 
proving consideration rests with the Plaintiff in an action for 
breach of contract. The Plaintiff presented no credible evidence 
demonstrating consideration. 
17. As of May 23, 1991, Defendant had fully performed 
his obligations under the 1989 stock purchase agreement and the 
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Plaintiff was legally obligated to convey his 258,363 shares of 
Medicode stock to Defendant. 
18. The performance of a preexisting duty does not 
provide consideration for a valid contract. 
19. Any concession extracted from the Defendant by the 
Plaintiff in the May 23rd alleged agreement lacks consideration 
and the agreement, therefore, is unenforceable. 
20. The May 23rd purported agreement was executed 
under the mistaken belief that $25,000 remained owing on the 
original agreement; thus, the May 23rd agreement was made under a 
mutual mistake of fact which went to its essence and, therefore, 
the putative agreement is unenforceable. 
21. Pursuant to the above findings the Court should 
enter an order directing Guardian State Bank Escrow Agent to 
disburse the funds of the escrow account to the Defendant, Eugene 
Horbach, or to his attorneys of record. 
22. Defendant asks for restitution in the amount of 
his overpayment for Plaintiff's Medicode stock. Unilateral 
mistake is remediable when it is a mistake in performance which 
results in overpayment. In cases of mistaken overpayment a 
remedy of restitution is available. 
23. In summary, the Court finds no cause of action on 
the Plaintiff's Complaint and awards to the Defendant those funds 
held in escrow account no. 30804165 at Guardian State Bank, Salt 
Lake City, Utah with accrued interest, as well as judgment 
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against the Plaintiff for sums overpaid in the amount of 
$169,501.75. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
1SJ DATED t h i s //y>3ay of ffl\lV , 1994 
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1 Q. It would be just in and around this same 
2 time frame. I really can't.... 
3 Q. Okay, we've pegged it then at the latter 
4 part of 1989? 
5 A. Okay. 
6 Q. That's exactly what you said in your 
7 Complaint, and I'm wondering if, since the Complaint 
8 was drafted, if you have any — 
9 A. I haven't reviewed the documents. You 
10 knew the original. So that's good enough. 
11 Q. Okay. I guess I could have gotten to 
12 that a lot quicker if --
13 A. If you had just said it. 
14 Q. Said it, yes. 
15 Did you have a written agreement? 
16 A. No, which is quite typical of Gene's 
17 style. 
18 Q. Okay. What -- what were the terms that 
19 you agreed upon orally with him? 
20 A. The terms that we agreed upon was that 
21 the price of the stock would be paid within just a 
22 short a period of time and that it would be paid in 
23 full, $2.75 cents a share. 
24 Q. What did "a short period of time" mean 
25 to you? 
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A d d e n d i u i Aft 
A. Gene, I believe, suggested a month or 
two. 
Q. Did he pay you anything at that time? 
A. Yes, I'm sure he did. He probably 
tendered a check of some amount. I canft remember the 
amount. It was.... 
Q. What was the total purchase price, then, 
as you recall? 
A. Honestly, we'd have to do some 
calculating, but I believe it was about 26,000 shares; 
is that correct? 26,000? No, no, no. I am sorry. 
It was 300, you know, 300 something thousand shares. 
Q. Let me refresh your memory. Your 
Complaint says 256,633 shares. 
A. Okay, that would be correct. 
Q. And if we times that by $2.75 cents, 
that's close to $706,000. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Nov/, do you have any recollection how 
much of that amount Gene paid to you at the meeting 
where you agreed to sell them? 
A. I don't remember the exact amount. 
Q. Do you have a rough figure? 
A. My guess would be 50,000. 
MR. TAYLOR: Let me — 
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1 Q. Approximately how many months? 
2 A. I don't know. We'd just have to check. 
3 Ten, 14 months. I am not sure. 
4 Q. Let's go up to the period stated in your 
5 Complaint, May 23rd, 1991. You've alleged that you 
6 had a meeting with Gene on that date. Do you recall 
7 where that meeting was? 
8 A. Yes, that was held at Medicode in their 
9 conference room. 
10 Q. Who was present? 
11 A. Gene Horback and myself, and in the 
12 waiting room were Brent Anderson and I believe Byron 
13 Smith and possibly Eileen Shanon. 
14 Q. You said Brent Anderson, and who's the 
15 second person? 
16 A. Possibly Byron Smith. 
17 Q. Were those three people employees of 
18 M e d i c o d e ? 
1 9 A . Y e s . 
20 Q. Were they all also stockholders? 
21 A. And officers, I believe. And 
22 d irectors. 
23 (}• Are all three of them still employed by 
24 I l e d i c o d e ? 
25 A. Justone at this time. 
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Addendum 50 
Q. Who's that? 
A. Eileen Shanon. 
Q. But they were not in the room during 
your meeting with Gene? 
A, No, they were there as we -- they 
actually called me at my office to come to meet with 
Gene because Gene wanted to -- he wanted me to sign 
the stock certificate. And he was going to exchange 
it -- a check for the stock certificate and an 
agreement for two percent of the company. So I came 
in and met with him. 
Q. Okay, tell me what was discussed to your 
best recollection? 
A. With Gene? 
Q. Yes, in this meeting on May 21st (sic) 
1991. 
A. Previous to this meeting for nearly a 
year, Gene, as we'd talk and he realized that he was 
delinquent on meeting his obligations and his 
commitment to buy my 18.6 percent -- Gene had agreed 
to giving me two to three percent of the company. And 
that was -- that was understood during the course of 
several months before this meeting. 
When I met with Gene, he -- I believe it 
was on Medicode letterhead -- wrote the note to assure 
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1 A. Just what you'd expect, you know, "Gene, 
2 this -- I don't need them if you can't make them 
3 g o o d / 
41 Q. Well, did you ever consider, during that 
5 period of time, just saying "the deal's off"? 
6 A. Absolutely, And I should have done it 
7 earlier than at this point. But had I known Gene 
8 would have given me a bad check at the date of the 
9 certificate, I certainly would have. 
10 Q. But that final bad check was essentially 
11 made good, wasn't it? 
12 A. A year later. 
13 Q. Is that "yes"? 
14 A. That check, yes, it was made good. 
15 Q. All right. 
16 Were you concerned about that final 
17 $25,000 check being good at the time Gene gave it to 
18 you? 
19 A. No, I obviously wasn't or I wouldn't 
20 have handed him the certificate. 
21 Q. I believe you testified that you didn't 
22 hand him the certificate. 
23 A. Well, Brent had me sign it right there, 
24 and he was handed the certificate. Whether Brent 
25 handed it to him or not, I don't know. I don't know 
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if it was me or Brent, but he obviously was in front 
of me long enough to sign it. 
Actually, Gene handed me the 
certificate, I believe, because he was in the room 
with it. Brent would have handed it to him. 
Q. At any rate, in terms of the cash 
consideration that Gene agreed to pay you for the 
stock, you have received all of that; is that correct? 
A. As I mentioned, I am uncertain on that 
$50,000 portion at this time. But other than that, 
thatf s correct. 
Q. Well, you've alleged in your Complaint 
that as of that meeting on May 23rd, 1991, that Gene 
had only paid you a portion of the purchase price and 
was, quote, seriously delinquent, closed quote. By my 
calculations, he had paid well over 90 percent of the 
purchase price by that point in time. Does that agree 
with you? Do you agree with me, rather? 
A. The delinquency is more an issue of 
time. In other words, a year -- a year, year and a 
half, had gone by that -- long -- the monies should 
have been paid. You know, that -- long before this 
t ime . 
Q. Well, and yet you continued to accept 
checks whether they cashed the first time or not over 
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that ten- or fourteen-month period; didnft you? 
A. Yes. I had -- I had no choice. I had a 
business I was running. 
Q. I submit that you will always have a 
choice. 
MR. MC VEY: Well, objection; 
argumentative. Don't answer that. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'll withdraw it. 
You have also alleged in your Complaint 
that counsel for Gene made some statements with regard 
to providing two percent of 18.6 percent of the 
Medicode Stock only if Medicode did a merger and a 
public offer ing. 
Number one, can you tell me who that 
counsel was for Horback? 
A. I'll need to give you some background 
because the -- in order to help you understand that. 
As per this agreement that is in front of me that Gene 
signed on 5-23-91, on, what, December of 1992, I had 
an offer for my stock from a qualified investor, and I 
submitted a request for my stock at that time to Gene, 
which is normal corporate protocol. And I faxed the 
request to both the board and to Gene. And Gene 
called me immediately and said that it wasn't a good 
time and asked me essentially to reconsider. I needed 
37 ENGLAND/TAYLOR 
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Q (By Mr. McVey) Please continue what your under-
standing was. 
A Just that, that the percentage again that I would 
have lost based on valuations of the MDR pre-merger, what the 
valuations were I would have lost in the ending Medicode 
valuation, that was just an additional sum that was paid just 
before the merger and we concluded that and went forward with 
the new Medicode. 
Q So as of 29 December, 1989, or thereabouts, when 
this $64,599 check was negotiated, did you understand at that 
time that you had received everything basically that you were 
owed to date for the MDR stock and whatever else you were due 
at that time? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Now we get up to the time frame of late December, 
early January 1990. At that point, was there an agreement 
struck, in your opinion, between you and Mr. Horbach for the 
purchase of Medicode stock? 
A Yes, there was. It was verbal, but we did. 
Q What was the agreement? 
A The agreement was to sell the remaining portion of 
my Medicode stock to Mr. Horbach at — I think we listed 
there the $2.75 per share. 
Q How much stock were you selling to him? 
A I'm not sure of the exact amount. It's just under 
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1 300,000. It was 257,000. Again Mr. Ensign could give you 
2 the exact number. 
3 Q What percentage of the company was that? 
4 A That was 18.6 percent. 
5 Q Were there any terms agreed to as far as payment 
6 for these 18.6 percent shares of stock was concerned? 
7 A It was my understanding — 
8 MR. CROCKETT: Objection, your Honor, foundation. 
9 THE COURT: Counsel, I think that's appropriate. 
10 We have apparently no writing memorializing this alleged oral 
11 agreement. I think, therefore, foundation is a proper objec-
12 tion and sustained. 
13 Q (By Mr. McVey) Were there any conversations 
14 between you and Mr. Horbach in which Mr. Horbach explained to 
15 you what he was going to do and where you explained to him 
16 what you were going to do in connection with this 
17 transaction? 
18 A He asked me if I would be interested in selling my 
19 Medicode stock and — 
20 MR. CROCKETT: Could we have a time? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. You can answer that question yes 
22 or no and then Counsel will get more into the particulars of 
23 what was discussed. 
24 Go ahead, Mr. McVey. 
25 Q (By Mr. McVey) Okay. When did these — well, the 
43 
00489 
answer is yes? 
A Yes. 
Q And when did these conversations take place? 
A The initial discussion was in January of 1990. 
Q And did these discussions take place on more than 
one occasion? 
A The initial discussion certainly laid out my needs 
and occurred, the initial discussion, in January of 1990. 
There were certainly numbers of discussions throughout the 
next months. 
Q And what was said in that discussion? 
A That initial discussion? 
Q Yes. 
A That again, we laid out the price per share and the 
time frame which I expected to be paid in and — 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Counsel, we need to 
have what was said and by whom at the meeting in January of 
1990. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Okay. What did Mr. Horbach say he 
was going to do in connection with the stock sale? 
A He said that he would be purchasing my stock at 
$2.75 per share. 
Q And what did you say? 
A I agreed that that sounded fine and requested that 
it be done in short order and I expected that to be the first 
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quarter. 
MR. CROCKETT: Objection, the expectation. 
THE COURT: Objection is sustained. Counsel, we 
need to know what was said and by whom. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Were any statements made about when 
that payment would be made, and if so, who made the 
statements? 
MR. CROCKETT: Judge, just can't we say who said 
what? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know how long the meeting 
lasted. I don't want to hear everything. 
THE WITNESS: I'm having trouble answering this 
because I'm just trying to give a straightforward answer. It 
was my recollection and it is my understanding that it was to 
be paid in two or three months. I don't know how else to 
answer that. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Do you recall that being — 
THE COURT: He's answered the best he can, Counsel. 
Let's move on. He's given his perception without who said 
what. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Were there subsequent meetings in 
January where this sale was discussed? 
A Between — 
Q Between you and Mr. Horbach. 
A Okay. There may have been one or two discussions 
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1 — I don't recall when or where — after this initial, you 
2 know, discussion. I might add, Gene would come into town, 
3 you know, at least every month and we would have dinner or 
4 breakfast meetings and discuss the events of the company. 
5 Q Now, at some point, did you begin receiving — 
6 well, did you transfer 18.6 percent stock certificates over 
7 to Mr. Horbach at that time? 
8 A No, I did not. 
9 Q At some point did you begin receiving payments from 
10 Mr. Horbach? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q And when was the first payment? 
13 A Okay, the first payment was in January of 1990. 
14 Q For how much? 
15 A $50,000. 
16 Q And you received that money? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And was there a statement of any kind by 
19 Mr. Horbach about what that payment was to be for? 
20 A I'm sure that it was stated that it was for — 
21 THE COURT: No, that's not the question. 
22 Q (By Mr. McVey) I want you to say just if you heard 
23 something from him. 
24 A I don't recall. 
25 Q Okay. What was your understanding of what the 
46 
00492 
Addendum 60 
1 payment was for? 
2 MR. CROCKETT: Objection, no foundation. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, again, is there any dispute 
4 with regard to the payments made by Mr. Horbach? Not the 
5 purpose, but the amounts and the dates as delineated and 
6 Proposed Exhibit IB? 
7 MR. CROCKETT: No, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. McVEY: Thank you. 
10 Q (By Mr. McVey) Did you have a follow-up meeting 
11 with Mr. Horbach during the time that he was making these 
12 payments to you where this transaction was discussed? 
13 A Yes. I recall very specifically a meeting on May 
14 15th, 1990. 
15 Q Where was that? 
16 A That was at Little America. It was a breakfast 
17 meeting. 
18 Q In Salt Lake? 
19 A Yes, it was. 
20 Q Who was there? 
21 A Mr. Horbach and myself. 
22 Q Tell me what conversations, the actual words that 
23 passed at that time between you and Mr. Horbach. 
24 A Mr. Horbach asked me who I would select as the next 
25 president and CEO of Medicode, and I gave him that 
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information as to be Eileen Shanon. That was one topic we 
discussed. 
We discussed, I'm sure, several other corporate 
issues. I did express my concern at that time that the stock 
payments had come in slowly and at that time the stock in 
Medicode hadn't been paid for. 
Q Did Mr. Horbach respond in any way to that concern? 
A Yes, he did. In fact, it was at that meeting that 
we originally discussed the two to three percent. 
Q I want you to just say what he said, okay, and what 
you said in response. 
A Okay. He — his actual words were, and this 
occurred on a number of discussions, but that I will take 
care of you. Those were his exact words. We talked about he 
wanted me to have some interest in the company because of my 
contributions, and at that time originally discussed his 
giving me two or three percent of the stock. 
Q Now, who discussed that? Who made the statement 
about the two to three percent? 
A Gene did. 
Q And what were the words that he used? 
A That I will give you two to three percent of the 
stock. 
Q Did you receive — now, over to the side of the 
date 18 May, 1990, you have a $50,000 amount in brackets. 
48 
00494 
everyone was provided a copy of this document and there was 
some discussion. 
MR. McVEY: Your Honor, the significance of that is 
that Mr. Horbach had a copy of this document. 
THE COURT: Well, you see, you're arguing your case 
to me. I don't know that. 
MR. McVEY: Well, that would be the inference, your 
Honor, and we would ask the Court to — basically the reason 
why the document is offered is it refers to Mr. England's 
rendering services and it's just offered to show that that 
was discussed at the time. 
THE COURT: And I understand your reason for want-
ing to offer it, but I likewise understand the reason the 
Defense wants to keep it out. 
The point is there needs to be further foundation. 
If you wish, I will take under advisement the offer at this 
point as to pages 1 and 2 of this exhibit, pending if you 
choose to call Mr. Horbach, to see if indeed he was provided 
a copy and this meeting did take place. 
MR. McVEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The third page of that document we will 
characterize as a new exhibit and receive it. It will be 
known henceforth as Exhibit 12. 
MR. McVEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Now, following the 18 May, 1990 
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meeting and the subsequent payments which nobody disputes, 
did you have a subsequent meeting with Mr. Horbach at which 
the delivery of the stock certificate for these 18.6 shares, 
percent of the shares, was discussed? 
A Yes, that meeting was on May 23rd, I believe. 
Q Of what year? 
A 1991. 
Q Who was present? 
A Eugene Horbach and myself. 
Q And who was there? — I'm sorry. And where was 
that? 
A Where was it? It was at the offices of Medicode. 
Q I'd like you to say what your statements were at 
that meeting and what Mr. Horbach said, if anything, in 
response. 
A We had discussed that we'd like to get everything 
cleared up, get the past taken care of, and we both mutually 
agreed that the $25,000 was — 
Q Okay, but tell me what statements Mr. Horbach made 
that would relate to this $25,000. 
A That that was the remainder owing for the purchase 
of the stock and then we discussed the two to three percent 
that he had earlier stated that he would give to me and that 
he wrote that, to that effect on letterhead of Medicode and I 
handed him or I signed the stock certificate and we 
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adjourned. 
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P-3. 
(By Mr. McVey) 
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A 
Q 
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Yes, I do. 
this 
what 
Do 
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On May 23rd, 1991. 
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time 
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on 
Horbach 
been marked as Plaintiff's 
recognize what's been marked 
that you saw that? 
you observe preceded your 
that day and the discussion 
write this exhibit? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Tell me what happened with regard to that. 
A He wrote it and signed it and gave me a check and I 
signed over the stock certificate and we adjourned. 
Q Now, down at the bottom of that exhibit there's 
some typewritten language. Is that something that you've 
added in? 
A It is, yes. 
Q So that's not something Mr. Horbach did? 
A No, it is not. 
Q Did Mr. Horbach make any statements about why he 
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1 was giving you this note? And once again, just what he said. 
2 A That it was in consideration for the delinquencies 
3 in payments and the time frame that everything had taken, you 
4 know, to get done and that's why, that's why we were trans-
5 acting this. 
6 MR. McVEY: Your Honor, at this time I'd request 
7 that Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3 be admitted. 
8 THE COURT: Any objection? 
9 MR. CROCKETT: No objection, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: It's received. 
11 Q (By Mr. McVey) I'm handing the witness what's been 
12 marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4, ask if you recognize that. 
13 A Yes, I do. 
14 Q What's that? 
15 A That is the check given to me for $25,000, given to 
16 me on May 23rd, '91, dated June 5th, '91. 
17 Q Did Mr. Horbach make any statements about why he 
18 was giving you that check? And once again, focus on his 
19 statements. 
20 A Yes, it was final payment for the stock purchases 
21 that had occurred. 
22 Q Now, you said that was final payment for the stock 
23 purchases. Was there anything discussed as to why he was 
24 giving you both the check and the note that reflects the two 
25 percent of the stock? 
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A The two percent, as I suggested earlier, was given 
because of the — 
MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, could we have what he 
said again? 
Q (By Mr. McVey) What did he say? 
A He --
MR. CROCKETT: I think it's repetitious. 
THE COURT: It is.. He's already testified as to 
what was said. 
MR. McVEY: Your Honor, at this time I'd like to 
hand the witness what's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
P-5, but before asking him questions on that, I'd like to ask 
that the check marked as Exhibit P-4 be admitted. 
MR. CROCKETT: This is not included in the packet 
of other checks? 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. McVEY: It is indeed. It's just the original. 
MR. CROCKETT: I think we should mark it twice. 
It's just repetitious, Judge. I have no real objection if 
Counsel wants to use it. 
THE COURT: All right. It's received. 
Q (By Mr. McVey) Do you recognize what's been marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q What's that? 
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1 A Yes, I do. 
2 Q And actually, there are four checks beginning on 
3 page 25 and continuing through page 28; is that correct? 
4 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q Is it your understanding that those were the checks 
6 that were paid to you to make up this $25,000 bounced check? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And the last payment is reflected on a check dated 
9 2-17-92; is that correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Now, on the back of that check which is on page 28 
12 of Exhibit P-l, there appear to be some handwritten words, 
13 "Final payment for stock purchase." 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Did you write those in? 
16 A No, I did not. Mr. Horbach did. 
17 Q At some point did you request that Mr. Horbach 
18 deliver to you the two percent of the stock that's reflected 
19 in the note, the handwritten note from the May meeting? 
20 A Yes, I did. 
21 Q Do you recall when that was? 
22 A It's the December — was it 1992? I think the 
23 exhibits have been — 
24 Q Well, let me provide you with what's been marked as 
25 Plaintiff's Exhibit P-6. I'd ask you if you recognize 
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1 Plaintiff's Exhibit P-6. 
2 A Yes, I do. 
3 Q Can you tell me what the first page of that exhibit 
4 is? 
5 A Yes. On December 2nd, 1992, I sent this letter to 
6 Gene. I believe I faxed it to him as well, and I had had an 
7 offer for the two percent, 26, 27,000 shares of Medicode 
8 stock as is appropriate on those occasions if we desire to 
9 sell, we have to make this offer, and this is an offer from a 
10 Mr. Porter. He'd been interested in — 
11 Q Okay. That's fine. Did Mr. Horbach respond in any 
12 way to this letter? 
13 A Yes, he did. 
14 Q How did that response take place? 
15 A He called me. 
16 Q When did he call? 
17 A He called me either the day of this fax or the day 
18 after. It was very close to this time. 
19 Q Tell me who said what in that telephone 
20 conversation. 
21 A Gene called me and he made mention of this offer 
22 and he said it was not good timing. 
23 Q Did he ever say anything denying that he owed you 
24 two percent of the stock? 
25 A He did not. 
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Q Now, the third page of that exhibit purports to be 
a letter signed by John A. Adams. Do you see that? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q And up at the top there's also a name, George 
Tingo. 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know if that letter was sent? 
A Yes, I believe it was sent. 
Q Was that done pursuant to your request? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, up to this time, that is, the December 1992 
time frame, had Mr. Horbach given you two percent of the 
stock? 
A No, he had not. 
Q And to this date, has he ever given you two percent 
of the stock in Medicode? 
A No, he has not. 
Q Now, you indicated that you had a reason for wait-
ing until February 1992 to ask for the two percent of the 
stock. What was your reason? In other words, why did you 
wait from the time that he gave you this note clear until 
December of 1992 to ask for the stock? 
A Well, the value was growing in the company. 
Q Other than the written letter that's been marked as 
Exhibit P-6, did you make any — have any other conversations 
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Q And you were being asked because you were aware the 
corporation had asked Mr. Horbach to give them some security 
for loans he had with the corporation? 
A No, I'm not. 
Q Okay, but you thought at that point in time you 
were still owed some money, didn't you, as of May 23rd, 1991? 
A That's correct. 
Q In fact, you thought you were owed anywhere between 
25 and 75 thousand dollars as of that point in time, didn't 
you? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q And you weren't sure which; isn't that also 
correct? 
A I can't answer that. I don't know. 
Q You don't know if you knew how much you were owed 
as of that point in time? 
A I can't give you the exact amount, no. 
Q Okay. Can you tell me if it was 25 or can you tell 
me if it $75,000? 
A I believe it was $50,000. 
Q Now, you told that to Mr. Horbach at the time, 
didn't you? 
A No, not at that time. 
Q At the May meeting you didn't say you were still 
owed money? 
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A Yes, I said $25,000. 
Q Okay. You told him you were owed 25,000 as of May 
1991 instead of 50,000? 
A Right. There was some question as to some service 
fees in the back, but that was what we had agreed upon is 
$25,000. 
Q Okay, and so whatever happened in May was predi-
cated on the mutual expressed assumption that you were owed 
$25,000; is that fair? 
A Fair enough. That was our final agreement. 
Q Okay. Now, you were reluctant to sign over the 
stock certificate unless you had some sort of way to know you 
were going to get paid and you expressed that, didn't you? 
A No, I didn't express that. 
Q You were reluctant to sign it over, though, weren't 
you, unless you knew you were going to get paid? 
A Well, that wasn't the reason. I don't understand 
your question. 
Q Sir, you were being asked to sign over the stock 
certificate. Were you willing to simply sign it over without 
doing something to get paid, or did you want to make sure you 
were going to get paid? 
A I was handed a check for $25,000. I was also 
handed the two percent agreement. That was sufficient con-
sideration for what we had been through. We both agreed on 
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Q Okay, so you required both a two percent agreement 
over the stock certificate; 
>. -hat fair? 
A That had been our agreement. 
Q Okay. Now, as of that point in time first, I 
I • I-'» i ' • J>greemen" , i» 1 vi • i » > January 
990 and we're talking the Medicode stock now. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And isn't it true, sir, that the first time you've 
! estilxtni I Luil i.l Wds uii I "l" Hi ii 1.1/ lifter von reive LVPCI tin 
checks and were shown that you had, if you included the 
December 1989 payment, you were already fully paid up by the 
?y± meeting? 
MR. McVEY: Objection, y<, a HUIHJI , misstates the 
testimony. The testimony was late --
THE COURT: Well, it may or may not misstate the 
Lest i mony I think this is cross-examination regarding some 
prior testimony given by the witness. It's pi: oper 
impeachment. 
Go ahead. 
WITNESS: steve, would you restate the 
question? 
Q (By Mr. Crockett% ~ would be happy to, sir. 
The first time you've taken the position that 
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Mr. Horbach, would you have any argument that it's different, 
or would you contend it's different than the 809,599.35? 
A No, that would be correct. 
Q Okay. Now, I'm going to assume for a second for 
purpose of the question, I want to do the stock shares in 
evidence and it's 258,363, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q The 2.75 a share, that was the agreed price? 
A Correct. 
Q So that equals $710,498.25? 
A Correct. 
Q And that's what you had coming for those shares of 
stock, isn't it? That's what you agreed to sell them for in 
any event? 
A Yes, in the initial agreement. 
Q Okay. Now, if in fact the 64,000 or any part of it 
and the 50,000 — well, let me break it out here. 
Let's assume that both of those are not included 
for a minute. 
A Okay. 
Q Exclude both of them, which is essentially what 
you've done on your chart, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q That would mean as of May 1981, you had been paid 
$695,000. Would you quarrel with that? 
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1 A • N o , I would not quarrel with that. 
2 Q So that's 695,000 of 710,498.25; you would agree 
3 t> lappens to be the case as of now, correct? 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q So when you told Mr. Horbach and he agreed with you 
6 I that I: i c w a s .(>9li llllll f lnwn in M \\ nil l r i r l l I'MU WPTP l n > l h w n ' i r n i 
7 I , i ii eren t y 3u? 
8 A Mathematically, yes. 
9 I Q Well — 
A 
Q Okay, so you were both in error on that assumption 
:)i:i that date in terms of what was left due and owing; is that 
13 | a fair statement? 
A No. 
15 I Q Putting aside the two to three percent, I'm just 
16 talking dollars for the stock. 
17 A Dollars for the stock, correct. 
18 Q You were both in error? 
19 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 Q' Okay. Now, sir, what he paid you then, and I've 
:l J done that I on] j did this once, though, it's close to 98 
pei cent, 97 9 percent, •  it' s accurate. 
23 I 'Now, after that «•» let me find something here. 
24 I Sir, you're aware that one of the disputes goes to 
:»iirpose c
 rhis payment here. You say it was personal 
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reimbursement for the expenses which he claimed he incurred 
in visiting Seattle. 
Q Was that more than one trip in visiting Seattle? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Now, you've heard the testimony about 
his stock being two to three percent decreased or something 
like that. 
A Not in my mind because if you go to the prior 
transaction, which is the MDR transaction, he got paid over 
$400,000 there, about 400 on the dot. 
MR. McVEY: Objection, nonresponsive. 
THE COURT: Mr. Horbach, listen fully to the 
question if you will, sir. 
THE WITNESS: Will do. 
THE COURT: And answer the question. 
Q (By Mr. Crockett) Okay. Now, for the MDR stock 
how much did you pay? 
A $400,000. 
Q And after you paid that, do you know if you bought 
— well, strike that. Let me back up here a little bit. 
When you bought the MDR stock, was that all of the 
MDR stock, to your knowledge, that Mr. England had? 
A No, I bought 250,000 shares. 
Q All right, and you paid that amount — I mean, he 
received 400,000 for those shares? 
128 
00574 
Did you find some checks in a drawer? 
We did find some checks which we didn't have access 
es. 
n Vay so it's been in the last 30 days you've kno mi 
the extent? 
ft Correct. 
2 
cent document, I think it's marked and received as Exhibit 
P J, at the point in time that you signed that, did you have 
I I .i belief that you owed Mr. England money? 
II I li il e thought that we still owed him ;.2":i „ 00 0 . 
12 And you've subsequently determined that was in 
II error? 
1 I Yes. 
15 MR McVEY: Objection, foundation. 
16 THE COURT: Sustained, unless you want to withdraw 
17 the question. 
III C r o c k e t t ) Sii whal w.n„ the p u r p o s e , w h a t 
19 was wu.r purpose in filling out Exhibit 3? 
20 To provide Mr. England with a collateral for his 
2 1 wh« he claimed to be remaining payments on the stock 
2 pun J iase. 
23 MR. McVEY: Your Honor, we will object to that on 
24 the basis of parole evidence, and 1 know we have a running 
25 objection, but we would make an objection. 
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1 Q You are involved in — you're an investor or have 
2 been an investor in approximately 30 or 40 companies over the 
3 last 30 years? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And in fact, you read the Wall Street Journal on 
6 occasion? 
7 A Yes, indeed. 
8 Q And you personally wrote the note you testified 
9 that was dated May 23rd, 1991, correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q At the May 23rd, 1991 meeting, was there ever any 
12 agreement in your mind on what the parties felt was actually 
13 owed for the remainder of the Medicode payments? 
14 A Mr. England claimed $25,000 and I believed him. 
15 Q What did you claim? 
16 A I agreed with him. 
17 Q Did you call your accounting staff? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Why did you pay Mr. England this additional 
20 $25,000? In other words, what were you hoping to get back in 
21 exchange for that? 
22 A Simply that we would complete the transaction on 
23 that particular day which was the release of his stock to the 
24 Medicode. 
25 Q And n e i t h e r of you f e l t t h a t w i thou t t h a t $25,000 
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payment, Mr. England would have to torn over that certificate 
\e stock; is that correct? 
A I don't remember my feeling. I simply Luecl I » 
expedite the transaction, so I agreed to pay $25,00(1' and give 
aim the note saying that he would get two percent of his 
stock •-.-.. 0. 
Q Now, throughout the time that you've dealt with 
England from 1988 up through May, or actually February 
/ou have made payments to him for things other than 
. , . is that correct? 
A Just one. 
Q And in fact, Mr. England has performed services for 
r ig that time? 
A No, . .it performed . 111 y . > e r v i c e s I 111 I f i I il 
Investments. "• England has continuously approached us to 
invest money :r some of his schemes. 
Q - id has performed services for you? 
A He wcc^  not performed any services for rue, period, 
England continuously approached us and other people to 
invest money in his new business opportunities and the 
,:orming. 
Q Now, you don't have any records r. f I-he MDR stock 
purchase other than these checks that you've produced; is 
that correct? 
A 
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A I told you I have never seen this document until 
recently. 
Q But the question is, do you recall — I didn't ask 
you about the document. I asked you if you'd heard any 
statements to the effect that Mr. England might be signing on 
with E & H Investments as a consultant or in a similar 
capacity? 
A No. 
Q Thank you. 
A And I want to bring up that — 
Q Excuse me, you'll have — there's no question. 
Was it your understanding that Mr. England would 
not have given you the 18.6 percent share certificate had you 
not given him the $25,000 check and the note that you wrote 
out for the two percent of the stock? 
A That was my impression. 
MR. McVEY: Thank you. No further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
MR. CROCKETT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Horbach, you may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. CROCKETT: Call Keith England. 
KEITH ENGLAND, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
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A Last summer. 
Q So summer of '93? 
A :. 
Q Was she under a doctor's care before that? 
A No. 
D ! Q Now, one more brief questio ': respect 
7 payment time frame 
8 I understanding of your ability to stop the merger? 
MR. CROCKETT: Objection, your Honor. It calls for 
i, :  • :)i icl x is ion, actually a conclusion in this instance, and 
chere's no foundation for it. 
12 I THE COURT: Well, moreover, I don't think, Counsel, 
1 "! l-hat. this was gone into "*y the Defense. The witness has 
II'II ilestifieci as >\^*> ---r . considerable 
15 J importance which Mr. Horbach placed on this acquisition of 
stock, and I think that I've heard enough on that issue. 
MR. McVEY: At this time the, we would have no 
tin1! quest.JUII Mi i unlet lest in inbuttiil. 
THE COURT: Is there anything? 
20 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. CROCKETT: 
22 Q Mr. Englanc 
23 wife is diabetic? 
24 A Yes, uh-huh. 
25 Q Has she been diabetic for a number of years? 
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A Oh, many years, uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. CROCKETT: Thank you. Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. England. 
Counsel, the evidence in this case now having con-
cluded, my view at this point is we should recess and I will 
work on my opinion. I believe that the issues are quite 
straightforward and accordingly, I choose at this point to 
dispense with closing argument. I've received a trial memo-
randum from the Defense. If you have a submission you want 
to give me at this point, Mr. McVey, I'll receive it. 
I'11 ask you to stay in the area. We'11 be in 
brief recess and when I'm ready to come back, the Bailiff 
will notify you. 
MR. CROCKETT: Your Honor, before you make your 
decision, I think we need to formally move to conform the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I took note of that in your 
trial memorandum. 
MR. CROCKETT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken, after which time 
the Court delivered its ruling, which ruling has been 
previously transcribed and is contained within a separate 
transcript volume.) 
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
1 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
1 APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
\ Appeal No. 940284 
i Subject to Assignment to the 
) Court of Appeals on Appeal 
i from a Decision by Third 
i District Court Judge 
J. Dennis Frederick 
Appellee, Eugene Horbac 1: i, l: y ai id thi:oug 1: i 1 :i Is co\ Inse 1, 
respectfully submits this memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of his Motion for Summary Disposition. 
BACKGROUND 
This case ut of a stock purchase agreement 
entered into by Lan England ("England") and Eugene Horbach 
("Horbach") in the latter part of 1989, whereby Horbach agreed to 
] hase from England 258,363 shares of stock in Medicode, Inc. 
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England's grounds for appellate review are so insubstantial as 
not to warrant further consideration by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's judgment is endowed with a 
presumption of validity. The evidence and all inferences that 
fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's conclusion. Cheney 
v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1963). Against this 
presumption, England, as the party attacking the judgment, must 
be able to affirmatively demonstrate clear error.2 This England 
cannot do. 
I. HORBACH'S RULE 15(B) MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO 
CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPER. 
In his trial brief, and by oral motion at trial, 
Horbach moved to conform the pleadings to the evidence.3 The 
trial court granted this motion, and duly considered Horbach's 
defense of mutual mistake and his counterclaim for restitution in 
the amount of overpayment.4 As the complete trial transcript 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence shall.not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1994). 
3
 Horbach's Trial Brief is attached as Exhibit "B." 
Trial transcript p. 152 attached as Exhibit "C." 
4
 Trial Transcript, at 152, attached as Exhibit "C." 
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THE COURT: The parties and counsel are present. 
I have had the further opportunity to examine the 
exhibits received and consider the evidence adduced in this 
matter and am prepared to rule. 
The plaintiff has sought by his Complaint a 
determination by this Court that the sole remaining defendant, 
Mr. Horbach, breached his contract of May 23rd, 1991, Exhibit 
3, wherein the defendant agreed to hold in perpetuity two 
percent of the Medicode stock in question in trust for the 
H I plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff sought declaratory and 
12 injunctive relief against the defendant on the theory that 
13 the plaintiff i? entitled to the stock in question and 
u sought an order from this Court enjoining the defendant from 
15 disposing of that stock pending the outcome of this litigation 
16 This Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
17 August the 5th of 1993 on the temporary restraining order 
18 issued by Judge Hanson and converted the temporary restraining 
19 order to a preliminary injunction to prohibit disposal of 
20 said two percent of the stock. 
21 The parties by stipulation now have sold the stock 
22 and the proceeds therefrom have been placed into an escrow 
23 account awaiting a ruling by this Court at trial. 
24 On the other hand, the defendant claims that the 
25 pivotal agreement, Exhibit 3, is unenforceable because of 
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1 failure of consideration and that it is violative of the 
2 rule against perpetuities. Moreover, the defendant overpaid 
3 the plaintiff, it is alleged, for the Medicode stock in 
4 question by several thousand dollars. 
5 As is typically the case in disputes of this type 
6 where no written document of agreement or sale is executed, 
7 the principals involved directly dispute the terms of their 
8 oral agreement and this Court must examine the credibility 
9 of the various witnesses who testified. 
10 The plaintiff denies the overpayments and claims 
11 that the sums paid over the purchase amount of 710,498.25 
12 representing the sale of 258,363 shares at $2.75 per share 
13 in accord with Exhibits 5 and 1-B were for special services 
14 rendered by the plaintiff in the form of consultation, 
15 examining real estate, cleanup for the merger, the impending 
16 merger, and incentive; yet, this alleged consulting agreement 
17 denied by the defendant was likewise not in writing and no 
18 billings evidence of such services were submitted. 
19 The plaintiff acknowledges that when he met with 
20 the defendant on May 23rd of 1991 when Exhibit 3 was 
21 executed, even he was under the impression there was still 
22 money owed for the original stock purchase agreement. 
23 The defendant testified that he paid additional 
24 monies and executed Exhibit 3 because he relied on and believe|d 
25 the plaintiff who claimed that additional monies were owed. 
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1 According to Exhibit 1-B, as of the meeting of 
2 May 13, of 1991, $855,000 had been paid, excluding the 
3 $4,599.35 paid on December 29, 1989, as part of the 64,000-
4 plus sum paid at that time. 
5 The plaintiff's claims are not credible. Even 
6 if the stock purchase price was arbitrarily established, 
7 nevertheless, it was established to the parties' mutual 
8 satisfaction. This Court is not persuaded that the plaintiff 
9 had an agreement to perform some 114,000 dollars worth 
10 of incentive real estate inspection or consulting services 
11 without so much as even a single billing for those services. 
12 There is no evidence regarding the rate of pay, the duration 
13 of the agreement, or the nature of the services presumably 
14 to be performed. 
15 While I recognize that this entire transaction is 
16 what might be characterized as loose, the plaintiff's claims 
17 in this regard stretches one's credibility or credulity. 
18 The credible evidence establishes that the 
19 plaintiff has been reimbursed for his legitimate expenses 
20 when given credit for the 4,599.35 paid on December 29, 1989. 
21 Furthermore, the defendant has more than complied, in this 
22 Court's view, with his part of the bargain and indeed, 
23 overpaid the plaintiff some $L69,501.75. That is arrived at 
24 by taking the total amount paid, $880,000, minus the purchase 
25 price of the stock in question of 710,498.25, in accord with 
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1 Exhibits 1 and 1-B. The so-called note, Exhibit 3, was 
2 executed under a mutual mistake of fact and was, in this 
3 Court's view, without consideration and therefore unenforceable 
4 The defendant has sought, pursuant to Rule 15(b) 
5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend his pleadings 
6 to conform to the evidence, and this Court is persuaded that 
7 the request is proper and that request should be granted and 
8 therefore is. 
9 Accordingly, this Court finds no cause of action 
10 on the plaintiff's Complaint and awards to the defendant 
11 judgment against the plaintiff for sums overpaid in the amount 
12 of $169,501.75. 
13
 Counsel, Mr. Crockett, you prepare the Findings 
14 J of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Are there any questions? 
Very well. Thank you. We'll be in recess. 
17
 MR. CROCKETT: Did you say judgment for the 
1Q plaintiff? You meant defendant. 
19
 THE COURT: Mr. Crockett, pardon me? 
20
 MR. CROCKETT: You said judgment in favor of 
21 plaintiff. I think you meant — 
22 THE COURT: Judgment in favor of the defendant in 
23 accord with Rule 15. 
24 MR. CROCKETT: Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
15 
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAN C ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, : PLAINTIFF LAN C. ENGLAND'S 
: TRIAL BRIEF 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 930901471 CV 
EUGENE HORBACH, MEDICODE : 
INCORPORATED, : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. : 
I. PAROLE EVIDENCE 
The Note transferring 2% of stock (Exhibit P-3) is clear and unambiguous. 
Parole evidence is not admissible to "change the terms of a written agreement which 
are clear, definite, and unambiguous." EJL Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v 
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144, 145 (Utah 1974). Parole evidence should be received only "to 
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clarify ambiguous language in a contract, but never to change the plain language of a 
written agreement. Id. 
H. CONSIDERATION FOR HORBACH'S PROMISE 
TO HOLD 2% OF THE STOCK IN TRUST 
Defendant claims he overpaid plaintiff for the 18.6% stock represented by the 
certificate in Exhibit P-5 and thus received no consideration for the 2% stock transfer. 
"Consideration is sufficient if there is a benefit to the debtor or an inconvenience or 
deprivation [detriment] to the creditor, such as a promise by the creditor to refrain 
from legal proceedings or an extension of time within which the debtor may pay the 
creditor." Ludwick v. Bryant, 697 P.2d 858, 861 (Kan. 1985). Such an agreement can 
be inferred from the parties> conduct. See 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 157 and cases 
cited therein. 
Extending the time for payment of a debt constitutes adequate consideration for 
a contract. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Higgins, 89 P.2d 916 (Kan. 1939). The 
simple act of delivering stock constitutes consideration if there is no contractual duty to 
do so or the duty is reasonably disputed. See Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242, 246-47 
(Wyo. 1943) ("The doing of anything beyond what one is already bound to do, though 
of the same kind, and in the same transaction may be a good consideration."); Safety 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) ("It has 
long been held that any forbearance to prosecute or defend a claim or action, or to do 
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an act which one is not legally bound to perform, is usually a sufficient consideration 
for a contract based thereon . . . ."). 
Any detriment to a promisor will constitute consideration. Thus, England's 
giving up his right to refuse delivery of the 18.6 % of stock, demand immediate 
payment, and related rights was also consideration for Horbach's agreement to hold 2% 
of the stock. In Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976), 
the court stated: "If one party asks for and receives something which he would not 
otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is adequate consideration." Moreover, the 
court in Powers Restaurants, Inc. v. Garrison, 465 P.2d 761, 763 (Okla. 1970), stated that 
"any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee" constitutes consideration. 
Further, the parties' agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction-the deal to 
sell 18.6% of the stock for the original purchase price would be satisfied by the 
substituted performance of a payment of $25,000.00 and 2% of the stock in exchange 
for the transfer of the 18.6% of the stock. "Accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract mutually agree that a performance different than that required by 
the original contract will be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed 
upon and that the substituted agreement calling for a different performance will 
discharge the obligation created under the original agreement." Neiderhauser Builders v. 
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). 
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m. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
The rule against perpetuities has been generally stated as follows: 
No interest [in property] is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later 
than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. It is 
not necessary that the interest vest in possession but merely that "the 
persons to take it are ascertained and there is no condition precedent 
attached to the remainder other than the termination of the prior estate." 
Anderson v. Anderson, 386 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1963). Courts have held that the rule 
does not apply to limit the duration of a trust, but simply applies to the time when 
legal title must vest in the trustee and the time when all beneficial or equitable 
interests created in the trust vest in the beneficiaries even though the duration of those 
vested interests may extend beyond the period of the rule. Joyner v. Duncan, 264 
S.E.2d 76, 82 (N.C. 1980). The Joyner court also stated that an interest is "vested when 
there is either an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of 
future enjoyment", . . . and that the rule is concerned solely with the time for vesting in 
interest of estates and not with the time the estates will vest in possession and 
enjoyment." Id. 
The substitute agreement does not violate the rule here. England's interest in 
and right to possession of the stock is fully vested at the time the agreement was 
entered into; England has a present fixed right to future possession or enjoyment of 
the stock. Indeed, Horbach gave England a present, vested, equitable interest in the 
- 4 -
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stock at the time of transfer, and the rule of perpetuities does not apply to the 
substitute agreement. As stated by the Joyner court, the fact that England did not 
possess the stock is wholly irrelevant for purposes of the rule. The Anderson case is 
directly on point and controls this case. 
IV. ORDERING FUNDS TO BE PAID OUT OF ESCROW 
England may recover the monies in escrow. The escrowed monies are the 
proceeds from the sale of 2% of Medicode stock, which England claims Horbach held 
in trust for him under their substitute agreement. Horbach has converted the stock 
into cash which England may recover. In Peterson v. Peterson, 190 P.2d 135 (Utah 
1948), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the right of a beneficiary of a trust to 
enforce the trust against proceeds in the hands of the trustee or against the trustee 
personally. See also In re Crawford, 795 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that 
when one person wrongfully takes the property of another and converts it into a new 
form, a constructive trust arises and follows the property or its proceeds); United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Hiles, 670 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1984); St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Company v. Seafare Corp., 831 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1987) (the beneficiary 
of a constructive trust may assert his rights in the proceeds from the disposition of trust 
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property). Further, the parties agreed to escrow the funds as security for plaintiffs 
claim. 
V. PLADSTTIFF CAN ELECT BETWEEN THE REMEDIES 
RESCISSION/DAMAGES/SPECIHCPERFORMANCE 
Rule 8 U.R.C.R permits a party to plead and pursue inconsistent remedies for 
the breach of a contract. See Midvale Motors. Inc. v. Saunders. 432 P.2d 37 (Utah 
1967). The Midvale court also stated that while a party has a right to demand election 
between inconsistent remedies sought by its opponent in the course of litigation, the 
party against whom the inconsistent remedies are sought does not have authority to 
make the election for the party seeking the alternative remedies. IdL at 39. Recent 
cases have indicated that the election between inconsistent remedies need not be made 
until the time of judgment. In Vinson v. Martin & Associates. 764 P.2d 736 (Ariz. 
App. 1988), the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 
Although his pleadings requested only specific performance, Vinson had 
not been put to an election of remedies in the trial court. A person 
cannot be forced to elect before the conclusion of trial the theory he will 
advance or the remedy he will seek. 
14 at 739; £££ also Arter v. Spathas. 779 P.2d 1066 (Or. App. 1989). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of 
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but 
to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes 
a choice between inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one 
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thereof, free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy 
evincing a purpose to forego all others. 
Royal Resources. Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp.. 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). 
The doctrine is not to be used to prevent a party from pursuing all of its possible 
remedies. It only precludes double recovery for a single wrong. 
VI. LEGAL INTEREST 
Prejudgment interest is awarded when a defendant delays in tendering or refuses 
to pay an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other obligation. U.C.A. § 15-
1-1. See Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724 (D. Utah 1992). Section 15-1-1 
provides: H(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum." Prejudgment interest should be awarded when the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time and can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. 
Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). England's damages were fixed 
as of the date Horbach refused to transfer the stock when England demanded transfer. 
Moreover, the damages can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. 
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Dated this £\ day of March, 1994. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Samuel D. McVey 
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